Published on Monday, March 15, 2004.
Common Dreams.
by
Rahul Mahajan
Last Thursday’s
attacks in Spain, in which 200 people were killed and nearly 1500 wounded,
were likely
carried out by al-Qaeda, not by the Basque separatist ETA. In any case,
they
make one thing very clear: terrorism cannot be fought by purely
military means.
After the first Gulf
War, and particularly after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, U.S. military analysts concerned themselves
extensively with the question of terrorism. An early conclusion was
that it is
precisely the extreme dominance of the U.S.
military that makes potential opponents
turn to what is sometimes called “asymmetric warfare” -- i.e., attacks
in which
the other side also has a chance of inflicting damage. For example,
Presidential
Decision Directive 62, issued in 1998, says, “America’s
unrivaled military superiority means that
potential enemies (whether nations or terrorist groups) that choose to
attack
us will be more likely to resort to terror instead of conventional
military
assault.”
The Bush
administration’s response, involving a tremendous new wave of
militarism, new
weapons systems, and a newly aggressive posture in the world could not
have
done more to exacerbate the threat of terrorist attacks if it had been
planned
that way.
Worse, there has
been a shift in the modality of attacks after 9/11. The 9/11 attacks
and
previous ones by al-Qaeda, like that on the U.S.S. Cole or those on the
U.S.
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, were attacks on hard targets,
requiring suicide
bombers and, in the case of 9/11, a highly sophisticated operation.
Furthermore, the targets were ones of obvious political significance;
there was
hardly a more potent symbol of American economic might and world
domination
than the World Trade Center. Contrary to popular depictions, at the
time al-Qaeda was not simply ravening to kill any American anywhere.
That changed after
the Afghanistan war, with a decision made by elders of
Al-Qaeda in Thailand in January 2002 to turn more toward soft
targets. The first major such attack was the November 2002 Bali nightclub bombing
which killed nearly 200.
The Madrid attack is just the most recent example of
this evolving dynamic.
And thus we are led
to the reductio ad absurdum -- more military prowess leads to
more
terrorist attacks, more defense of hard or politically significant
targets
leads to more indiscriminate attacks on soft targets, and it is simply
impossible to defend all soft targets. Today the trains of Madrid.
Tomorrow the New York subway?
The progression of
events in Iraq under the occupation mirrors this logic.
Initially, one saw
mainly attacks on the U.S.
military. It quickly responded by
increasing the level of alert, and so August of last year saw numerous
terrorist attacks. The U.N. humanitarian headquarters was attacked and
Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim was assassinated at the Imam Ali mosque in
Najaf.
These were still aimed at very specific persons or organizations and
involved
targets with some level of protection.
As Iraq
began to fill up with concrete barricades
and razor wire, the targets changed. Attackers who had earlier
concentrated on
the Iraqi police as collaborators with the occupation took to bombing
lines of
people waiting to interview for jobs as police. Cleaning women who
worked on a
CPA base were gunned down. Attacks against random targets of
opportunity
proliferated. The culmination was on Ashura, the holiest day of the
year for
the Shi’a a dozen suicide bombers attacked
processions in Baghdad and Kerbala (and tried to in Basra and Najaf),
killing
likely over 200 people.
In the unlikely
event that al-Qaeda didn’t do this, whoever did it was inspired by
al-Qaeda.
The attack involves the same modus operandi, the same abandonment of
any idea
of winning support for body count as the sole criterion of
effectiveness. If
non-Islamist organizations come to adopt the same methods, the danger
is only
increased.
In fact, the
dominant theme of the U.S.
“war on terrorism” has also been
abandonment of political effectiveness for body count. Just look at
pronouncements by Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush, and others that the war
on Afghanistan was and is a success because we have killed
hundreds of Taliban in recent months. The military calculus implicit in
such
judgments simply doesn’t apply to the political situation that we have
to deal
with.
What is needed is a
rational calculus, which allows us to judge how to genuinely weaken
al-Qaeda,
et al., instead of posturing and pretending that cruise missiles weaken
them.
Such considerations will immediately lead us to the conclusion that
what is
necessary is taking away the political ground on which they stand. That
ground
is not the virtually nihilistic domestic political programs of these
groups. It
is their opposition to U.S.
imperial control of the Islamic world, a
grievance that most Muslims share.
Some stab at dealing
with these problems in particular, the
beginning of an end to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory
and to
the U.S. occupation of Iraq is
necessary in order to create an environment in which other steps
against
al-Qaeda will genuinely weaken it. What’s relevant is not the political
aspirations of Osama bin Laden, but rather the political grievances of
the
people of the Islamic, especially the Arab, world. The fact that the
Middle
Eastern and North African countries with the most “pro-American”
regimes have
the most anti-American populaces is clear evidence that the problem is
not, as
the neoconservatives would have us think, an absence of American
influence and
control but rather an excess.
No sensible person
thinks that moves on these issues will dissuade al-Qaeda from its
fight. The
point is to isolate it so that international police actions are easier
to set
up and carry out, on the one hand, and so that they don’t lead to more
proliferating terrorism on the other hand.
Spanish turned out
in unexpectedly high numbers and, in a reversal of all recent poll
results,
voted Aznar’s party out of power on Sunday. Although al-Qaeda and the
American
right wing will see this as appeasement, it is to be hoped that it is
rather a
recognition that dealing with al-Qaeda-style terrorism requires
rational
measures.
At this point, it
shouldn’t matter whether you’re whether you’re a dove or a hawk, left
or right,
concerned with the suffering of others or concerned merely with your
own skin.
Bush’s “war on terrorism” is a “cure” that increases the spread of the
disease.